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How important are sanitary and phytosanitary barriers in  
international markets for fresh fruit? 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Horticultural crops represent a large share of the global value of agricultural trade, and 
international markets for these products are increasingly important in many regions of the world.  
Table 1 shows import values for the top twenty-five horticultural crops in 2005; the total import 
value for the crops listed in Table 1 was $68.8 billion, and the total import value for all 
horticultural commodities was approximately $96 billion in 2005 (FAO 2010).  The importance 
of these crops in total agricultural trade is highlighted when compared to the traded values of 
major meat and grain products.  In 2005, global imports of key meat products (pig meat, chicken 
meat, and cattle meat) were valued at $21.4 billion and grain products (wheat, corn, soybeans, 
and rice) were valued at approximately $60 billion (FAO 2010).  The final column in Table 1 
shows the increases in nominal value of trade between 1991 and 2005; on average, the nominal 
value of trade across the horticultural commodities listed in Table 1 increased by 117.1% 
between 1991 and 2005. 
Similar to other agricultural commodities, trade in horticultural crops is affected by a 
range of barriers including domestic support in selected markets, tariffs, and in many cases 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures.  Domestic support comprises a substantial share of 
total revenues for many horticultural crops in the European Union (Stuart, 2005; Roberts and 
Gunning-Trant, 2006), but elsewhere there is very little domestic support applied in horticultural 
markets.  Tariffs for horticultural products are relatively high compared to other agricultural 
commodities, and are widely applied in various regions (see Gibson, Whitley, and Bohman 
2001).  Increasingly, SPS measures have become more prevalent for many horticultural crops 
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imported into the United States (USDA-ERS 2009) and elsewhere (Disdier, Fontagné, and 
Mimouni 2008).  The World Trade Organization (WTO) case that examined the apple trade 
dispute between Japan and the United States generated much interest in the economic effects of 
SPS regulations for horticultural crops (e.g., Calvin and Krissoff 1998; Roberts and Krissoff 
2004; Yue, Beghin, and Jensen 2006; Calvin, Krissoff, and Foster 2008).  In addition, Peterson 
and Orden (2008) studied the welfare effects of SPS measures applied to avocado trade between 
the United States and Mexico; Romano and Thornsbury (2006), Sunkist Growers (2006) and 
USITC (2006) examined the role of SPS measures in selected citrus markets.     
Economists have devoted some attention to the implications from potential reductions in 
subsidies and tariffs for agricultural commodities as both have been included on the negotiating 
agenda of the WTO (Sumner 2000; Bagwell and Staiger 2001).  Much of this work has found 
that reductions in tariffs would have much larger global welfare effects than would reductions in 
domestic support (e.g., Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga 2004; Rickard and Sumner 2008).  This 
result is driven by the fact that domestic support is predominantly applied to farm commodities 
and tariffs are applied to farm commodities and value-added food products. 
Agricultural economists have long emphasized that the effects of non-tariff barriers need 
to be studied carefully (e.g., Hillman 1978, Thilmany and Barrett 1997; James and Anderson 
1998, Wilson and Antón 2006; Cipollina and Salvatici 2008), and within this effort there is room 
for work that leads to a better understanding of the relative effects of various trade barriers 
applied to agricultural products.  Research has examined the effects of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers in poultry markets (Peterson and Orden, 2005), in seed corn markets (Jayasinghe, 
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Beghin and Moschini 2009), and for cut flowers (Lui and Yue 2009); however, these relative 
effects have not been assessed in international markets for fruits and vegetables.  
We extend research in this arena by simulating the welfare effects that would result from 
reductions in tariffs and SPS regulations applied to fresh fruit products.  Specifically, we focus 
on trade barriers applied in global markets for apples and oranges, and we chose these crops for 
two reasons.  First, both fruit crops are widely produced and consumed, and international 
markets are important for apples and oranges.  Data from countries in similar geographical areas 
were aggregated to construct six regions (North America, South America, Europe, Africa, West 
Asia, and East Asia), and the information in Table 2 outlines production and consumption 
patterns for both crops in these six regions
1
.  In addition to the intra-regional trade flows that 
exist, Table 2 shows that approximately 9.4% of fresh apples and 9.5% of fresh oranges are 
traded outside of the producing region.  Second, of the SPS disputes for fruit products reported to 
the WTO between 1995 and 2009, 14.3% were for apples and another 16.3% were for citrus 
products, including oranges (WTO 2010a).  Outside of the trade dispute between Japan and the 
United States, the effects of SPS measures in global apple markets have not been studied in 
detail.  There is also evidence that SPS measures are important in global markets for citrus yet 
these effects have not been quantified carefully.  Furthermore, because trade barriers applied to 
oranges are often similar to those applied to other citrus crops, the results for oranges may be 
able to shed some light on the likely effects of trade barriers applied to other citrus crops.   
A simulation model is developed in this paper that allows for differentiated products and 
is used to examine the effects of trade barriers in global markets for apples and oranges.  
Including fruit from six different regions enables us to examine the trade diversion effects of 
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trade barriers, and this is a phenomenon that would be missed in an analysis of trade policy that 
only examines bilateral trade.  By also allowing some substitution between the differentiated 
fruits, we are also able to consider potentially important product diversion effects associated with 
reductions in various trade barriers.  A model that includes substitution between fruit produced in 
different regions allows international markets to respond more fully to changes in trade policies.    
2.  A closer look at key SPS measures in fresh fruit markets 
Between 1995 and 2009 there were 289 cases reported as a Specific Trade Concern 
(STC) to the WTO, of which 139 pertained to meat products, 27 to vegetable products, and 49 to 
fruit products (WTO 2010a).  The STCs for fruit products were mostly raised for reasons related 
to plant health, food safety, and risk assessment.  A summary of key SPS disputes applied to 
apples is provided in Table 3; for each SPS dispute we list the countries involved, the price in the 
importing country, the producer price in the exporting country, the distance between the 
countries, and whether the dispute was raised as a STC to the WTO.  The United States was the 
exporting country in seven of the fifteen disputes listed in Table 3, although the United States 
only raised two of these cases as STCs to the WTO.  Table 4 outlines the key SPS disputes that 
have been applied to fresh orange markets between 1995 and 2009.  In Table 4 we see that the 
United States was the exporting country in seven of the eighteen disputes initiated, and one case 
was raised as a STC.  Many of the SPS disputes involving oranges (and other fresh citrus 
products) centered on plant health issues involving citrus black spot, citrus canker, and sweet 
orange scab.   
Economists have commonly converted SPS measures and other technical barriers to trade 
into tariff rate equivalents using the price-wedge approach (e.g., Deardorff and Stern 1998; 
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Beghin and Bureau 2001).  The price-wedge approach quantifies the impact of an SPS barrier as 
the difference between prices in the importing country and the exporting country, after 
accounting for various transactions costs.  Commonly, transaction costs in the price-wedge 
method include tariffs and transportation costs, but do not explicitly account for all of the other 
factors that may create price differences between countries.  For example, fruit quality, fruit 
variety, market power, and retail search costs are expected to influence international price 
differences for apples and oranges.  Data to quantify such factors are not available, and are not 
included in our price-wedge calculation.  We don’t expect that fruit variety, market power, and 
retail search costs are important drivers of international price differences; however, there is some 
evidence that fruit quality may differ between fruit-producing countries (e.g., xxx 2019) and this 
may contribute to the observed price differences between regions.  Therefore, the ad valorem 
rates calculated here represent the maximum impact, or an upper bound effect, of SPS measures.  
The price-wedge approach does assume that the imported product is a substitute for the 
domestically produced product; however, recent work has extended the framework to 
accommodate trade of differentiated products (Yue, Beghin, and Jensen 2006). 
Others have quantified the effective rate of protection offered by SPS measures following 
an approach that assesses costs of compliance (e.g., Hooker and Caswell 1999; Calvin, Krissoff, 
and Foster 2008; Peterson and Orden 2008; Karov, Roberts, and Grant 2009).  If various 
transaction costs are difficult to quantify, or if there is significant heterogeneity between 
domestic and imported products, the cost approach may offer a more realistic assessment of the 
effect of an SPS measure.  However, cost information associated with specific SPS measures is 
often difficult to collect, and is likely to vary widely across firms and management practices.  
 6 
 
Furthermore, collecting costs of compliance becomes increasingly difficult as additional trade 
partners are included in the analysis.  We employ the price-wedge approach given the number of 
regions and SPS measures that are included in our analysis.  In addition, our simulation model is 
developed to accommodate substitution possibilities between imported and domestically 
produced products, but we incorporate substitution directly in the demand elasticities rather than 
in the price-wedge calculation.   
The ad valorem rate for an SPS measure applied by country k to product j imported from 
country h, denoted as θkhj, is calculated following equation (1).  Here the ad valorem rate for an 
SPS measure is the ratio of the producer price in the exporting country h (P
h
j) to the imported 
price in country k (PM
k
j) less ad valorem rates for tariffs applied by importing country k (τ
k
j), and 
ad valorem rates that reflect domestic transportation costs in the importing country (δkj) and 
international transportation costs (ωkhj).  Country-level tariff rates for apples are listed in Table 5 
and for oranges in Table 6 (International Customs Tariffs Bureau 2010; International Trade 
Administration 2010).  For simplicity, and following the approach used in Calvin, Krissoff, and 
Foster (2008), transportation costs are set equal to a share of the import price.  Baseline 
international transportation costs are also adjusted to account for the distances between major 
ports in the partner countries (Sea Rates 2010). 
(1) θkhj = (P
h
j/PM
k
j) – τ
k
j – δ
k
j – ω
kh
j  
Equation (1) is used to calculate country-level ad valorem rates of support associated 
with SPS measures for apples and for oranges; these rates are subsequently used to quantify 
regional-level tariff-equivalent SPS rates.  We calculate such rates for key SPS measures that 
have been documented in the academic literature, in government reports, and by industry 
 7 
 
stakeholders between 1995 and 2009.  In addition, we use equation (1) to calculate the country-
level rate of protection for the SPS measures raised as STCs by WTO members.  Results from 
equation (1) are subsequently used to calculate regional-level SPS rates.     
3.  Simulation Model 
A simulation model is developed and used to assess the implications of trade barriers 
applied to international markets for fresh apples and fresh oranges.  A set of basic equations is 
used to describe the supply, demand, and international market clearing conditions for a selected 
fruit crop.  This equilibrium displacement model includes markets for six outputs differentiated 
by production region, and accommodates trade flows between the six regions identified in Table 
2.  Muth (1964) provided the derivations for the one-output, two-input model, and agricultural 
economists have used equilibrium displacement models to study a wide range of research topics 
(e.g., Gardner 1987; Alston, Norton, and Pardey 1995; Brester, Marsh, and Atwood 2004; 
Pendell et al. 2010).   
The structure of the model is given in equations (2), (3), (4) and (5).  The term Q is used 
to denote a quantity and P denotes a price; the suffix D denotes a variable on the demand side.  
Equation (2) represents demand for fresh fruit product j in region y, and is a function of the price 
of fruit j, prices of all other differentiated fruit products i, and exogenous demand shifters (Aj).  
Equation (3) represents the supply of fruit product j; it depends on its own price and exogenous 
supply shifters (Bj).  The internal arbitrage conditions are described in equation (4); wedges 
between the price in the consuming region and the producing region are introduced through 
tariffs (τyj) and SPS regulations (θ
y
j), expressed in ad valorem equivalents, applied to product j by 
region y.  Equation (5) represents the international market clearing condition for fruit product j; 
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the quantity supplied of product j is the sum of the quantities demanded across the regions 
included in the model.     
(2) QD
y
j = f 
y
j (PD
y
j, PD
y
i; A
y
j)    
(3) Qj = gj (Pj; Bj) 
(4)  PD
y
j = Pj (1 + τ
y
j + θ
y
j)  
(5) Qj = yQD
y
j     
Totally differentiating equations (2), (3), (4) and (5) and converting to elasticity form 
yields the linear elasticity model in equations (6), (7), (8) and (9).  The linear transformation 
framework is convenient as an approximation but none of the results hinge on this simplification.  
These equations do not involve any explicit or implicit assumptions about the functional forms 
used, and it is not necessarily assumed that the elasticities are constant.  However, it is assumed 
that the supply-and-demand functions are approximately linear at the initial point of market 
equilibrium (Alston, Norton, and Pardey 1995).  In the following equations, for any variable X, 
E(X) represents the relative change in X, that is, E(X) represents dX/X where d refers to a total 
differential.   
(6) E(QD
y
j) = 
y
jjE(PD
y
j) + i
y
jiE(PD
y
i) 
(7) E(Qj) = 
y
jE(Pj)  
(8) E(PD
y
j) = E(Pj) – E(1 + τ
y
j) – E(1 + θ
y
j) 
(9) E(Qj) = y[(QD
y
j/Qj)E(QD
y
j)] 
Simulations are performed by exogenously specifying changes in the trade policy 
parameters in equation (8).  Values for demand elasticities in equations (6), supply elasticities in 
equation (7), and initial quantity parameters in equation (9) are held constant as exogenous 
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changes to policy are applied.  The price elasticity of demand for the product j with respect to the 
price of product i in region y, is represented by 
 y
ji.  The own-price elasticity of supply of 
product j in region y is represented by 
y
j.  The term E(1 + τ 
y
j) represents a change in the 
regional ad valorem tariff rate and the term E(1 + θyj) represents a change in the regional ad 
valorem tax rate that is associated with a specific SPS measure for product j in region y.  The 
initial quantity parameters in equation (9) are used to identify the shares of product j that are 
consumed in the various regions.  Each parameter (QD
y
j/Qj) is the share of total production of j 
that is consumed in region y.  Our model with six differentiated products and trade between six 
regions yields a system of eighty-four equations. 
3.1  Model parameters 
Several parameters are required in the simulation model including supply elasticities, 
demand elasticities, changes in policy parameters, and initial quantity shares.   Baseline supply 
elasticities are defined using estimates in the literature, and the own- and cross-price elasticities 
of demand are calculated following an Armington approach (Armington 1969).  Parameters 
describing changes in tariffs are based on current ad valorem rates (International Customs Tariffs 
Bureau 2010; International Trade Administration 2010).  Changes in SPS regulations are 
simulated using the country-level measures calculated in equation (1).  The simulation model 
also requires parameters to describe initial quantity shares for the differentiated products in the 
six regions; these are calculated with the information shown in Table 2 (FAO 2010).  Full details 
about the parameterization of elasticity parameters and policy changes are outlined below.   
Following work by Davis and Espinoza (1998) and Zhao et al. (2000), we apply prior 
distributions to baseline elasticity parameters.  We use a central tendency (equal to the baseline 
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parameter) and specify a variance of 0.04 to develop beta (3,3) distributions that are applied to 
all supply, demand, and substitution elasticities (Brester, Marsh, and Atwood 2004).  The beta 
distribution is a continuous two parameter distribution that is symmetrical when the parameters 
are equal, and is equivalent to the uniform distribution when the parameters are equal to 1.  The 
beta distribution is often used to model events which are constrained to take place within an 
interval defined by a minimum and maximum value.  The beta distributions selected here 
constrain demand elasticities to be negative and supply elasticities and substitution elasticities to 
be positive.  The simulation model draws values for these parameters to generate an empirical 
distribution of results.  The empirical distribution includes the results from 1000 iterations of the 
simulation model. 
Several estimates of supply elasticities for fresh fruits, including apples and oranges, exist 
in the literature.  Nerlove and Addison (1958), Askari and Cummings (1977), Gardner (1979), 
and Shumway and Lim (1993) among others, report estimates of the own-price elasticity of 
supply for various agricultural products; estimates for fresh fruits were typically less than 0.5 in 
the short-run and ranged between approximately 0.35 and 2.5 in the long-run.  We also expect 
that the elasticity of supply of fresh fruits is relatively inelastic in response to reductions in trade 
barriers in the short- to medium-run.  We set the baseline supply elasticity parameter for apples 
and oranges equal to 0.5 in our model.  Because apples and oranges are perennial crops, we 
assume that all cross-price elasticities of supply for fruits produced in different regions are 
negligible, and these parameters are set equal to zero. 
The matrices of own- and cross-price elasticities of demand for the fruit crops are 
calculated following an Armington-type specification (Armington 1969).  The Armington model 
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extends the homogeneous goods model to examine the demand response for a group of related, 
yet differentiated, goods.  An Armington approach is often used to define the matrix of own- and 
cross-price elasticities of import demand when goods are differentiated by country of production. 
This specification requires parameters that describe the overall elasticity of demand for the group 
of goods, consumption shares for specific goods, and the degree of substitutability between 
goods.  Piggott (1992) and Alston, Gray, and Sumner (1994) present an outline of the limitations 
of the Armington specification, as well as an overview of Armington models that have been used 
in earlier applications.  The calculation used to compute the own-price elasticity of demand for 
product j, represented by 
y
jj, is shown in equation (10); the calculation used to compute the 
elasticity of product j with respect to the price of product i, represented by 
y
ji, is shown in 
equation (11).   
(10) jj = j  – (1 – j)           
(11) ji = i (  + ) 
The share of consumption for product j is denoted as j, and the consumption shares used 
to calculate Armington elasticities are based on the information shown in Table 2.  For example, 
the consumption share of apples produced in South America and consumed in Europe is 10.1%.  
The elasticity of substitution between the fruits produced in different regions is represented by  
in the Armington calculations.  The elasticity of substitution parameter would be equal to zero 
when no substitution across products is possible, and increases as substitution possibilities 
increase.  Estimates of the elasticity of substitution between fruit crops produced in different 
regions are not available; however, a range of parameters have been used in the agricultural 
economics literature to describe such substitution possibilities (e.g., Alston, Gray, and Sumner 
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1994; Yue, Beghin, and Jensen 2006).  We set the baseline elasticity of substitution parameter 
equal to 1.0 in our simulation model, and as we assume that there is some substitution among 
fruit crops between regions but that fruit crops are more differentiated than grain or oilseed 
crops.  The overall elasticity of demand for each fruit crop is represented by η in equations (9) 
and (10); using estimates reported in Huang (1985), Huang and Lin (2000), and USDA-ERS 
(2010) we set the baseline parameter equal to –0.5 in the apple model and in the orange model.    
Policy parameters that describe possible changes in tariffs and SPS measures are used to 
introduce shocks in the simulation model.  Here we consider a 36% reduction in regional-level 
tariff rates following the commitments agreed to under the Uruguay Round under the auspices of 
the WTO (WTO 2010b).  We also model the effects of eliminating regional-level regulations 
stemming from SPS concerns, and eliminating regional-level regulations that have been 
identified at STCs by the WTO.   
Country-level tariff rates (τkj) are weighted by country-level consumption shares to 
construct regional-level tariff rates following equation (12).  The ad valorem rate for an SPS 
measure applied by country k to product j imported from country h, denoted as θkhj, is calculated 
using the price-wedge method introduced in equation (1).  In equation (13) we use the calculated 
country-level ad valorem rates for SPS barriers to develop regional-level measures of protection.  
Here the country-level SPS measures are weighted by consumption shares in the importing 
region and by production shares in the exporting region.  Country k is an importer of product j 
within region y, and country h is an exporter of product i within region z; product j and product i 
are fresh fruits differentiated by production region.  When SPS measures are applied between 
countries in the same region, product i and product j are equivalent, as are regions y and z.       
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(12) τyj = Σk [(QD
k
j
 
/QD
y
j) τ
k
j] 
(13) θyj = Σh Σk [(QD
k
j
 
/QD
y
j)(Q
h
i/Q
z
i) θ
kh
j] 
Table 5 lists country-level tariff rates for apples in key consuming countries in each 
region
2
, and highlights the regional-level tariff rates that are calculated following equation (12).  
Regional-level tariffs for apples range between 1.3% and 35.9% across the six regions, and the 
highest tariff rate is in the West Asia region.  For specified exporting countries, Table 5 also lists 
the country’s regional production share and the country-level rate of protection from SPS 
measures generated using equation (1).  Following equation (13), regional-level SPS rates for 
apples are calculated and shown in the final column of Table 5.  Regional-level SPS rates range 
between 0% and 29.5%.  Table 6 shows ad valorem equivalents for tariffs and SPS measures in 
the six regions for fresh oranges.  Here we see regional-level tariff rates ranging between 2.2% 
and 31.0%, and the rate of protection from SPS measures ranges between 0% and 43.9% at the 
regional-level.  Tables 5 and 6 reveal that the East Asia region applies the greatest number of 
SPS measures in apple and orange markets.  Furthermore, North America employs a relatively 
high rate of protection from SPS measures, and a relatively low rate of protection from tariffs, 
for apples and oranges.   
The final column in Tables 5 and 6 shows the rate of protection from STCs in 
parentheses.  These regional-level rates range between 0% and 10.0% for apples, and between 
0% and 43.8% for oranges.  Overall, SPS and STC measures are important between certain trade 
partners, but because many individual countries comprise a small share of production or 
consumption regionally, the ad valorem rates for regional-level SPS and STC barriers are 
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relatively modest in most cases.  Tables 5 and 6 show the presence of tariffs in all regions, and in 
some regions they are quite large, whereas SPS are much less widespread.   
3.2  Measuring changes in economic welfare  
Simulated changes in prices and quantities from reductions in tariffs and rates of 
protection stemming from SPS measures also yield changes in measures of economic welfare.  
The changes in economic welfare accruing to consumers and producers are measured using 
information about initial product prices and quantities, and the simulated changes in product 
prices and quantities.  The mean change in consumer surplus for product j in region y is 
calculated using information from 1000 iterations of the simulation model.  Individual iterations 
draw values for elasticity parameters from empirical distributions that rely on estimates in the 
literature; however, values for initial prices and quantities remain the same across all iterations of 
the simulation model.  Because a range of elasticities are incorporated into the calculations used 
to simulate changes in prices and quantities, empirical distributions of the changes in welfare 
measures are generated.  Presenting the results in this way provides a range of the most likely 
effects of reductions in tariffs and elimination of SPS measures, and allows for a better 
understanding of how potential changes in trade barriers would impact stakeholders in 
international markets.   
In equation (14) we outline the calculation used to assess welfare changes for consumers, 
which in our case is the first handlers, of product j in region y (denoted as CS
y
j).  Here the 
initial consumer price of product j in region y is denoted by PD
y
j and the initial quantity 
consumed of product j in region y is denoted by QD
y
j.  The initial consumer price for product j in 
an importing region is the average import price; the initial consumer price in the producing 
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region is the import price less any tariffs and transaction costs included in equation (1).  The 
calculation used to characterize a change in producer surplus for product j ( PSj) is shown in 
equation (15).  Here the initial quantity supplied of product j is denoted by Qj and the initial 
producer price for product j is denoted by Pj.   
(14) CS
y
j = –PD
y
jQD
y
jE(PD
y
j)[1 + 0.5E(QD
y
j)]  
(15) PSj = PjQjE(Pj)[1 + 0.5E(Qj)] 
The change in net surplus also depends on the change in taxpayer surplus, and we 
calculate these effects following equation (16).  Changes in the taxpayer surplus accrue when 
tariff rates change or when the quantities to which they apply change.  Changes in the taxpayer 
surplus in region y, denoted as TS
y
j, depend on the initial tariff rate for product j in region y, 
denoted by t
y
j, initial quantities demanded, and changes in both tariff rates and quantities 
demanded.   
(16) TS
y
 = jt
y
jPD
y
jQD
y
j{[1 + E(PD
y
j) + E(QD
y
j) + E(PD
y
j)E(QD
y
j)][E(1 + τ
y
j)] – 1}  
Combining the welfare effects from equations (14), (15), and (16), equation (17) shows 
how the change in net surplus in region y ( NS
y
) is calculated.   
(17) NS
y
 = j( CS
y
j) + PS
y
j + TS
y
   
The change in net surplus in region y is the sum of changes in consumer surplus across 
output markets, the change in the producer surplus, and the change in taxpayer surplus.  For the 
simulated changes in tariffs and SPS measures applied to apple markets and orange markets, we 
report all welfare effects in the six regions, and the overall welfare effects.  We also use the 
simulated changes in welfare to report a set of transfer efficiency ratios; these ratios show the 
change in producer or consumer surplus as a share of the change in net surplus.      
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4.  Results 
We simulate the effects of reducing import tariffs, removing tariff-rate equivalents of 
SPS measures, and removing tariff-rate equivalents of STCs in global markets for apples and 
oranges.  Regional-level trade barriers are modeled as ad valorem price wedges between the 
price received by producers in exporting regions and the price paid by first handlers in importing 
regions.  Exogenous policy changes used in our simulations are based on published tariff rates 
and SPS rates that were calculated following the price-wedge method.  Table 7 reports the mean 
welfare changes for each policy experiment; below the mean change we also show the 95% 
confidence interval for each welfare change based on 1000 iterations of the simulation model.  
The range of values in the 95% confidence interval are relatively small and do not change the 
major thrust of the results, therefore, in the discussion below we will focus on the central values.  
Results from our analysis will facilitate a comparison of the welfare effects across types of trade 
barriers in the global market for apples and the global market for oranges.  It also allows for a 
comparison of the relative effects of similar trade barriers in the two fresh fruit markets.   
The first column of results in Table 7 shows the simulated effects of reducing global 
tariffs for apples by 36%.  Here we see relatively large effects in Europe and West Asia, and both 
regions would experience substantial increases in consumer surplus.  The overall mean change in 
global welfare from a 36% reduction in apple tariffs would be $135.3 million; the transfer 
efficiency ratios indicate that producers would receive 16.8% of the change in net surplus and 
consumers would receive 130.4%.
3
  Our simulation results show that removing SPS barriers in 
apple markets would have much smaller effects than those from a 36% reduction in tariffs.  
Removing SPS measures would have important implications in specific regions, notably East 
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Asia, but the total net welfare effect would be only $27 million.  The net effect of SPS measures 
in global apple markets is approximately 20% of that from a 36% reduction in apple tariffs.  
Removal of only STC barriers would lead to even smaller effects and a total welfare change of 
$8.5 million, which represents 6.3% of the change simulated from the tariff reduction.  
Furthermore, eliminating SPS or STC measures in apple markets would transfer most of the 
benefits to consumers with negligible transfers to producers.    
The final three columns of results in Table 7 show the simulated effects of policy changes 
in global orange markets.  Similar to the simulated results of tariff reductions for apples, a 36% 
reduction in tariffs applied to oranges has important effects in several regions.  The total change 
in net welfare from a 36% reduction in tariffs would be $89.7 million; the transfer efficiency 
ratios shows that 32.4% of the net welfare change accrues to producers and 102.8% accrues to 
consumers.  Removal of all SPS barriers in the global orange market would have large welfare 
effects for producers in North America and South America, consumers in Europe, and would 
lead to a net change in total surplus of $143.8 million.  The net effect for producers and 
consumers from removing all SPS barriers is approximately 25% larger than the net effect of 
reducing tariffs by 36%.  The simulation that considers removal of STCs in the orange market 
yields results that are surprisingly large; here we see a total change in net surplus of $70.6 
million.  The transfer efficiency ratios for the simulations that remove SPS and STC measures 
indicate that approximately 30% of the total change in net surplus is received by producers and 
approximately 75% of the total change in net surplus is received by consumers.   
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5.  Industry and policy implications 
International trade in fresh fruit is an important part of total agricultural trade.  Apples 
and oranges are two of the most highly traded fruit products; they also face non-trivial tariffs 
and, in many cases, various SPS barriers.  In this article we collect information about SPS 
regulations applied to apple and orange markets, and develop a framework that uses the price-
wedge method to calculate the equivalent ad valorem rates of protection from the non-tariff 
barriers.  A simulation model that accommodates trade between six regions and differentiated 
products is employed here to examine the welfare effects of reducing tariffs, removing SPS 
measures, and removing STCs in these markets.  Simulation results indicate that modest 
reductions in tariffs would lead to substantial increases in welfare in most regions, and overall.  
Our findings also suggest that the welfare effects of SPS regulations are not consistent across the 
two fruit products, and that it is important to consider the effects of such measures separately for 
different products. 
A 36% reduction in global tariffs would increase total producer and consumer welfare by 
$199.1 million in apple markets and by $121.3 million in orange markets.  Removing SPS 
regulations would also have important welfare effects for selected trading partners; relative to 
tariffs, the total impact of SPS barriers appears to be much less important in apple markets and 
more important in orange markets.  In addition, STCs do not appear to be a significant barrier to 
trade in apple markets, but removing them in orange markets would generate welfare gains that 
are in the range of the welfare gains associated with a 36% reduction in global tariffs.  Because 
tariffs are applied widely, reductions in tariffs lead to greater trade diversion effects and more 
widespread welfare implications.  However, SPS barriers tend to be less widely applied and our 
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results show that removal of SPS barriers would lead to larger welfare changes for a 
concentrated subset of stakeholders.  We would expect to see the welfare effects of reductions in 
SPS barriers to be even more concentrated in a bilateral trade framework, or in a model that 
introduces less trade diversion, or less product diversion.   
 There is a concern that non-tariff barriers, including SPS measures, are increasingly being 
used to impede trade in food and agricultural products.  The WTO Agreement on the Application 
of SPS Measures introduced a much needed framework for identifying these non-tariff barriers, 
defining the appropriate level of protection (or the acceptable level of risk), and providing a 
mechanism for examining the related economic implications.  However, many SPS regulations 
are used for the reasons they were developed, that is, to protect animal or plant life or health.  If 
we assume that the group of SPS measures labeled as STCs represents those trade barriers that 
distort trade, and that the price-wedge method provides an upper bound on the ad valorem rate of 
support for these measures, then there is strong evidence that modest changes in tariffs will lead 
to larger overall welfare effects than would the removal of the STCs.  Continuing with reductions 
in tariffs, similar to those that were introduced as part of the Uruguay Round, will also generate 
meaningful increases in producer and consumer surplus in many regions as tariffs are applied 
widely across countries and regions.  Furthermore, if new SPS measures emerge as tariffs 
continue to decrease, the Agreement on the Application of SPS Measures may become even 
more effective in identifying potential STC measures that impede trade.  
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Table 1: Import values for the top 25 most traded horticultural commodities 
Commodity Total import 
value 
2005 
($ billion) 
Increase in nominal 
trade value 
1991 to 2005 
(%) 
Coffee 10.09 29.4 
Bananas
 
8.32 58.7 
Tomatoes 5.04 119.9 
Cocoa beans 4.86 102.9 
Grapes 4.62 134.2 
Apples 4.11 46.2 
Tea 3.29 26.4 
Oranges 3.11 42.3 
Peppers 2.77 188.3 
Almonds 2.31 238.3 
Tangerines and mandarins 2.26 73.7 
Lettuce and chicory 1.78 94.2 
Pears 1.62 82.9 
Pineapples 1.46 313.2 
Peaches and nectarines  1.38 37.2 
Cucumbers 1.37 67.7 
Lemons and limes 1.36 115.2 
Hazelnuts 1.34 164.5 
Cashew nuts 1.34 199.9 
Kiwi 1.33 77.7 
Strawberries 1.31 78.7 
Pistachios 1.05 121.8 
Avocados 0.96 284.9 
Cabbages 0.86 85.4 
Garlic 0.84 143.2 
Total 68.80 117.1 
 
Source: FAO (2010).
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Table 2: Production and consumption patterns for fresh apples and oranges in 2005 
 
 
 
Apples 
Quantity 
Produced 
Quantity consumed in:  
North  
America 
South 
America 
Europe Africa West 
Asia 
East  
Asia 
Thousand metric tons 
North 
America 
4,800 4,225 84 60 28 253 150 
South 
America 
4,300 77 3,351 432 140 220 60 
Europe 
 
15,400 4 4 15,000 100 160 2 
Africa 
 
1,900 6 2 180 1,650 50 3 
West  
Asia 
 
9,300 1 0 80 40 9,000 90 
East  
Asia 
26,700 43 1 340 33 715 25,560 
 
Oranges 
 
       
North 
America 
8,400 7,900 5 10 0 70 350 
South 
America 
26,400 30 26,000 180 2 6 2 
Europe 
 
5,800 5 2 5,650 3 80 3 
Africa 
 
5,600 100 1 740 4,100 530 120 
West  
Asia 
 
13,400 2 0 70 3 13,200 0 
East  
Asia 
3,300 60 0 10 3 100 3,100 
 
Source: FAO (2010). 
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Table 3: A description of key SPS regulations in the global market for apples 
 
Importing 
country 
Import 
price 
($/ton) 
Exporting 
country 
Producer 
price
a 
($/ton) 
Distance
b 
(thousand 
miles) 
Source(s) describing  
SPS regulations  
 Specific Trade 
Concern
 
USA 724 EU
c 
356 3.64 European Commission (2010) No 
USA 724 South Africa 368 7.82 NFAPP (1996) No 
USA 724 China 453 6.47 WTO (2010a) Yes 
Mexico 836 USA 384 3.96 NFAPP (1996) No 
Cuba 600 Argentina 278 6.84 WTO (2010a) Yes 
Slovak Republic 733 Hungary 126 0.10 WTO (2010a) Yes 
S. Africa 704 China 453 9.42 South Africa DOA (2007)  No 
Indonesia 522 USA 384 8.51 Becker (2006) No 
China 747 USA 384 6.47 WTO (2010a) Yes 
Japan 2339 USA 384 5.52 WTO (2010a) Yes 
S. Korea 2093 USA 384 6.08 Nogueira and Chouinard (2006)  No 
Australia 746 USA 384 7.76 Nogueira and Chouinard (2006) No 
New Zealand 1243 USA 384 6.54 Nogueira and Chouinard (2006)   No 
New Zealand 1243 Australia 1237 2.34 WTO (2010a) Yes 
 
a 
Producer prices represent prices in exporting countries (FAO 2010). 
 
b
 Data taken from Sea Rates (2010); here 1 nautical mile equals 1.1508 miles. 
 
c
 France was the top exporting member state of the EU for apples between 2000 and 2008, and therefore the French producer price for 
apples is used here.   
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Table 4. A description of key SPS barriers in the global market for oranges 
 
Importing 
country 
Import 
price 
($/ton) 
Exporting 
country 
Producer 
price
a 
($/ton) 
Distance 
(thousand 
miles) 
Source(s) describing  
SPS regulations  
 Specific Trade 
Concern
b 
USA 992 Mexico 60 3.96 Becker (2006) No 
USA 992 Argentina
c
 121 8.38 WTO (2010a) Yes 
Mexico 245 USA 114 3.96 NFAPP (1996) No 
Barbados 639 Venezuela 143 0.34 WTO (2010a) Yes 
Costa Rica 63 Nicaragua 69 0.30 WTO (2010a) Yes 
EU 625 Brazil 47 3.60 WTO (2010a) Yes 
EU 625 Argentina
c
 121 6.41 WTO (2010a) Yes 
EU 625 Chile 166 7.51 Magalhães (2001) No 
EU 625 South Africa 189 5.84 Magalhães (2001)   No 
EU  625 Uruguay 237 5.96  Magalhães (2001) No 
India 502 USA 114 9.35 Becker (2006) No 
Indonesia 534 USA 114 8.51 Becker (2006) No 
China 629 Argentina 121 12.74 WTO (2010a) Yes 
China 629 EU
d
 277 11.12 European Commission (2010) No 
China 629 USA 114 6.47 NFAPP (1996) No 
Japan 915 USA 114 5.52 WTO (2010a) Yes 
Australia 1104 USA 114 7.76 NFAPP (1996)  No 
New Zealand 850 USA 114 6.54 Becker (2006) No 
 
a 
 Producer price in the exporting country. 
b
 Specific Trade Concerns (WTO 2010a) include seven disputes related to SPS measures for oranges between 1995 and 2009. 
c
 Due to currency fluctuations in Argentina in 2005, we report the Argentine producer price in 2002. 
d
 Spain has been the top EU exporting member state for oranges, and therefore the Spanish producer price for oranges is used here.   
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Table 5: Ad valorem rates for trade barriers in global apple markets 
Importing region Importing 
country 
Importing 
country’s regional 
consumption 
share 
Ad valorem 
tariff rate
a 
Exporting  
region 
Exporting 
country 
Exporting 
country’s 
regional 
production share 
Country ad 
valorem 
SPS rate
b 
Regional  
ad valorem  
SPS rate
c
  
(STC rate) 
North America   1.3      
 USA 88.0 1.3 Europe EU 100 33.5 29.5 (0) 
 USA 88.0 1.3 Africa S. Africa 36.3 24.3 7.8 (0) 
 USA 88.0 1.3 East Asia China 89.9 12.6 10.0 (10.0) 
South America   16.5      
 Mexico  20.5 33.0 North America USA 91.5 5.1 1.0 (0) 
 Cuba 0.03 4.0 South America Argentina 28.0 28.9* 0.002 (0.002) 
 Brazil 21.6 10.0      
 Argentina 24.6 10.0      
Europe   16.0      
 Slovakia 0.3 16.0 Europe Hungary 4.3 61.6* 0.008 (0.008) 
 Other EU-27 72.2 16.0      
Africa   30.6      
 South Africa 22.8 19.0 East Asia China 89.9 5.6 1.1 (0) 
 Egypt 33.3 20      
 Morocco 17.2 52.0      
 Algeria 15.1 47.0      
   12.2      
West Asia   35.9      
 Indonesia 12.3 15.0 North America USA 91.5 3.9 0.4 (0) 
 India 17.5 15.0      
 Iran 25.4 15.0      
 Saudi Arabia 4.4 0      
East Asia   22.8      
 China 90.5 23.0 North America USA 91.5 4.3* 7.0 (3.6) 
 Japan 3.1 25.0 North America USA         91.5 45.9*  
 South Korea 12.3 50.0 North America USA 91.5 17.7  
 Australia 1.2 10.0 North America USA 91.5 15  
 New Zealand 1.4 0 North America USA 91.5 51.8  
 New Zealand 1.4 0 East Asia Australia 1.2 5.3* 0.001 (0.001) 
 
a
 Sources: International Customs Tariffs Bureau, 2010; International Trade Administration, 2010. 
b
 SPS measures that have been identified as STCs by the WTO are denoted with an asterisk. 
c
 Country-level ad valorem tariff rates are weighted by the importer’s consumption share and exporting production share to calculate regional-level SPS rates. 
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Table 6: Ad valorem rates for trade barriers in global orange markets 
 
Importing region Importing 
country 
Importing 
country’s regional 
consumption 
share 
Ad valorem 
tariff rate 
Exporting  
region 
Exporting 
country 
Exporting 
country’s 
regional 
production share 
Country 
ad 
valorem 
SPS rate
 
Regional  
ad valorem  
SPS rate  
(STC rate) 
North America   2.2      
 USA 97.2 2.2 South America Mexico 15.8 83.4 14.1 (1.3) 
 USA 97.2 2.2  Argentina 2.7 49.0*  
South America   15.2      
 Mexico 15.8 38.0 North America USA 100.0 37.0 5.8 (0) 
 Barbados 0.01 35.0 South America Venezuela 1.4 37.6* 0.003 (0.001) 
 Costa Rica 2.0 14.0  Nicaragua 0.3 40.8*  
 Argentina 2.7 10.0      
 Brazil 68.2 10.0      
Europe   16.0      
 EU-27 90.6 16.0 South America Brazil 67.8 68.5* 43.9 (43.8) 
 EU-27 90.6 16.0  Argentina 3.4 49.3*  
 EU-27 90.6 16.0  Chile 0.5 38.6*  
 EU-27  90.6 16.0  Uruguay 0.7 27.8  
 EU-27 90.6 16.0 Africa South Africa 22.3 37.2 7.5 (0) 
Africa   26.2      
 Egypt 37.8 20.0      
 Morocco 13.9 50.0      
 Ghana 12.0 0.0      
 Algeria 10.5 47.0      
West Asia   31.0      
 India 23.9 40.0 North America USA 100.0 16.0 10.9 (0) 
 Indonesia 16.4 15.0  USA 100.0 44.1  
 Pakistan 12.6 25.0      
 Turkey 9.5 72.0      
 Iran 15.0 15.0      
East Asia   23.1      
 Japan 5.3 25.0 North America USA 100.0 50.1* 10.2 (2.5) 
 Australia 10.5 10.0  USA 100.0 63.7  
 New Zealand 0.6 0.0  USA 100.0 72.2  
 China 76.4 25.0 South America Argentina 3.4 41.9 1.1 (0) 
 China 76.4 25.0 Europe EU 99.8 10.9 8.3(0) 
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Table 7: Effects of reductions in tariffs and SPS barriers in fresh fruit markets
a 
 
Importing 
region 
Change in economic 
surplus for: 
 
Apples Oranges 
Policy Change: 
36% Tariff 
Reduction  
Remove SPS  
Barriers 
Remove STC 
Barriers
b 
36% Tariff 
Reduction  
Remove SPS  
Barriers 
Remove STC 
Barriers
b 
  Million USD 
North 
America 
Producers 19.9 
(14.3, 28.9)  
3.5 
(2.7, 4.7)  
1.9 
(1.4, 2.8) 
20.2 
(14.0, 30.8)  
22.9 
(15.9, 34.5) 
4.7 
(3.3, 7.1)  
Consumers -17.0 
(-21.7, -13.8) 
13.0 
(12.6, 13.5) 
1.4 
(1.0, 1.7) 
-17.1 
(-22.7, -13.1)  
-7.2 
(-13.3, -2.8)  
-3.3 
(-4.6, -2.4) 
 Taxpayers -0.003 
(-0.008, 0.002)  
-0.1 
(-0.1, -0.02)  
-0.004 
(-0.01, 0.01) 
-0.1 
(-0.1, -0.03) 
-0.03 
(-0.1, 0.03)  
0.002 
(-0.004, 0.01) 
 Net 
 
2.9 
(2.3, 3.6)  
16.5 
(16.1, 17.0)  
3.3 
(3.3, 3.4) 
3.1 
(2.8, 3.5)  
15.7 
(15.2, 16.3)  
1.4 
(1.4, 1.5)  
South 
America 
Producers 15.6 
(11.9, 21.1) 
-0.1 
(-0.1, -0.001) 
0.01 
(0.003, 0.01) 
3.1 
(2.2, 4.0)  
23.1 
(15.1, 36.5) 
20.5 
(13.2, 32.7)  
Consumers -5.6 
(-8.4, -3.6) 
0.5 
(0.5, 0.6)  
-0.02 
(-0.03, -0.01) 
-0.6 
(-1.1, -0.04)  
-22.1 
(-29.2, -16.8) 
-20.0 
(-26.4, -15.2)  
 Taxpayers -1.1 
(-1.3, -0.9)   
-0.003 
(-0.02, 0.01)  
-0.0001 
(-0.001, 0.001) 
-0.4 
(-0.4, -0.3)  
0.01 
(-0.01, 0.02) 
0.01 
(0.003, 0.01)  
 Net 
 
8.9 
(8.2, 9.8)  
0.5 
(0.5, 0.5)  
-0.01 
(-0.02, -0.003) 
2.1 
(2.0, 2.2)  
1.0 
(0.9, 1.2)  
0.5 
(0.4, 0.6)  
Europe Producers -15.2 
(-36.5, 3.1)  
4.3 
(2.9, 6.9)  
0.2 
(0.1, 0.2) 
-2.5 
(-6.4, 1.2)  
-9.3 
(-18.8, -1.6)  
-2.5 
(-5.2, -0.5)  
 Consumers 54.7 
(44.0, 65.1)  
-3.6 
(-4.9, -2.7)  
0.4 
(0.3, 0.4)  
35.7 
(33.9, 37.3)  
108.5 
(102.5, 115.9)  
68.7 
(65.4, 72.5)  
 Taxpayers -7.9 
(-8.7, -7.1)  
0.04 
(0.01, 0.1)  
-0.002 
(-0.003, -0.001) 
-6.7 
(-7.4, -5.8)  
-5.0 
(-6.5, -3.3)  
-4.1 
(-4.9, -3.1)  
 Net 
 
31.6 
(31.0, 32.4)  
0.7 
(0.6, 0.9)  
0.5 
(0.5, 0.6) 
26.5 
(25.8, 27.2)  
94.2 
(90.7, 98.3)  
62.1 
(59.2, 65.7)  
Africa Producers 
 
1.9 
(1.5, 2.5)  
0.1 
(0.1, 0.1) 
-0.001 
(-0.002, -0.001) 
20.8 
(15.9, 27.8)  
9.8 
(7.6, 12.8)  
-0.4 
(-0.8, -0.1)  
 Consumers 
 
20.6 
(20.1, 21.0)  
0.02 
(-0.03, 0.1)  
-0.01 
(-0.01, -0.01) 
-11.4 
(-14.4, -9.0)  
-7.1 
(-8.5, -6.0)  
0.3 
(0.1, 0.4) 
 Taxpayers 
 
-7.3 
(-8.3, -6.2)  
0.006 
(-0.01, 0.02)  
0.0001 
(-0.001, 0.001) 
-1.0 
(-1.1, -0.8)  
0.02 
(0.01, 0.03)  
-0.001 
(-0.002, 0.001) 
 Net 
 
15.1 
(13.9, 16.6)  
0.2 
(0.2, 0.2)  
-0.01 
(-0.01, -0.01) 
8.4 
(7.4, 9.8)  
2.7 
(2.2, 3.2)  
-0.1 
(-0.2, -0.01)  
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Importing 
region 
Change in economic 
surplus for: 
 
Apples Oranges 
Policy Change: 
36% Tariff 
Reduction  
Remove SPS  
Barriers 
Remove STC 
Barriers
b 
36% Tariff 
Reduction  
Remove SPS  
Barriers 
Remove STC 
Barriers
b 
  Million USD 
West Asia Producers 
 
-11.5 
(-25.0, -0.2)  
-0.1 
(-0.3, -0.02) 
0.01 
(0.002, 0.03) 
-13.5 
(-28.0, -1.6)  
-0.5 
(-1.1, -0.1)  
-0.1 
(-0.2, -0.002)   
 Consumers 
 
110.4 
(103.4, 118.4)  
0.7 
(0.5, 0.8) 
-0.01 
(-0.1, 0.04) 
53.9 
(46.9, 61.3)  
2.8 
(2.6, 3.1)  
0.1 
(-0.02, 0.1) 
 Taxpayers 
 
-41.3 
(-45.0, -36.8)  
-0.03 
(-0.1, 0.004) 
0.01 
(0.003, 0.01) 
-15.0 
(-16.4, -13.3)  
-0.2 
(-0.3, -0.1)  
-0.003 
(-0.01, 0.001)  
 Net 
 
57.7 
(53.3, 62.8)  
0.5 
(0.4, 0.7) 
0.01 
(-0.04, 0.1) 
25.5 
(24.1, 26.8)  
2.1 
(2.0, 2.3)  
-0.008 
(-0.03, 0.02)  
East Asia Producers 12.0 
(2.8, 21.1)   
-7.7 
(-16.3, -0.6)   
-3.4 
(-7.6, 0.1) 
1.0 
(0.02, 2.0)  
-1.9 
(-3.8, -0.4)   
-0.5 
(-0.9, -0.1)  
 Consumers 13.3 
(7.8, 18.5) 
16.8 
(12.6, 21.2) 
8.1 
(6.1, 10.1) 
31.7 
(31.1, 32.3)  
31.0 
(30.1, 32.0) 
7.3 
(7.1, 7.5)  
 Taxpayers -6.2 
(-7.0, -5.3)  
-0.3 
(-0.6, 0.1) 
-0.1 
(-0.3, 0.1) 
-8.4 
(-9.5, -7.2)  
-1.0 
(-1.9, 0.2)  
-0.1 
(-0.4, 0.2)  
 Net 
 
19.1 
(18.2, 20.2)  
8.8 
(8.5, 9.0)  
4.6 
(4.4, 4.7) 
24.3 
(23.2, 25.6)  
28.1 
(27.1, 29.3)  
6.7 
(6.5, 7.0)  
Total Producers 22.7 
(-31.0, 76.5)   
0 
(-11.0, 11.1)   
-1.3 
(-6.1, 3.1) 
29.1 
(-2.3, 64.2)  
44.1 
(14.9, 81.7)   
21.7 
(9.4, 39.1)  
 Consumers 176.4 
(145.2, 205.6) 
27.4 
(21.3, 33.5) 
9.9 
(7.3, 12.2) 
92.2 
(73.7, 108.8)  
105.9 
(84.2, 125.4) 
53.1 
(41.6, 62.9)  
 Taxpayers 
 
-63.8 
(-70.3, -56.3)  
-0.4 
(-0.8, 0.2) 
-0.1 
(-0.3, 0.1) 
-31.6 
(-34.9, -27.4)  
-6.2 
(-8.8, -3.1)  
-4.2 
(-5.3, 2.9)  
 Net 
 
135.3 
(43.9, 225.8)  
27.0 
(9.5, 44.8)  
8.5 
(0.9, 15.5) 
89.7 
(36.5, 145.5)  
143.8 
(90.3, 204.0)  
70.6 
(45.7, 99.1)  
 Producer Transfer 
Efficiency Ratio (%) 
16.8 
 
0 -1.5 32.4 30.7 30.7 
 Consumer Transfer 
Efficiency Ratio (%) 
130.4 101.5 116.5 102.8 73.6 75.2 
 
a
 For each simulated welfare change, the 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses below the mean value. 
b 
The column labeled STC includes only those SPS measures that were listed as Specific Trade Concerns (WTO 2010a).  
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Footnotes 
 
1
 We follow the system used by FAO (2010) to aggregate countries into regions.  A complete 
listing of the countries in each of our six regions is available from the authors.   
2 
We include the countries that represent at least 75% of the total consumption in each region. 
3 
Simulations that involve reductions in tariffs yield negative welfare changes for taxpayers, and 
therefore the transfer efficiency ratios for producers and consumers will sum to more than 100%.    
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